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CHAPTER V. 
§ I. What is to be our criticism of the Dutch rules of application 
contained in the maritime law of the Commercial Code? 
We have seen that when a law is indicated which must then be 
applied by the Courts. that law is the one which. in the view of the 
Legislator. fundamentally and originally governs the contract and 
created it out of a simple agreement between the parties to which 
no legal consequences attached until the law in question transformed 
it into a contract and defined the resultant consequencres. In the 
view of the Legislator these consequences result from the law indi-
cated by him and the Judge must therefore apply that law to the 
contract. 
Now assuming for a moment that the articles declared applicable 
the whole of Dutch law regarding a contract of carriage. instead 
of certain rules only. then in that case the conclusion would be that 
the intention was as follows: that the contract of carriage should 
sometimes be governed by the law of the place of departure (articles 
517d § I. 517y. 520f. 520t). at other times by the law of the place 
of destination (same articles). and finally on a few occasions by the 
law of the flag of the transporting vessel (518g. 520f). 
Three different laws therefore would produce consequences 
arising out of the contract as soon as it was concluded; three dif. 
ferent laws would define how far the parties were free to apply 
pules other than those made applicable by these three laws or to 
choose another law to govern their contract; three different laws 
would govern all the matters which we have found to be subject 
to the law governing the contract - the question therefore whether 
~he contract was validly made or not. the question of intention or 
confidence, questions as to free consent, error, constraint, fraud. 
laesio enormis and their consequences, the cause and the subject. 
the care to be exercised, the necessity of evidence of default .... the 
consequences of misperformance -- indemnification. dissolution .-
and the penalty clause, questions of risl, and vis major, the 
condition and the stipulation of time; the effect of a moratorium, 
the obligatio in solidum, divisibility or indivisibility, the claim 
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of third parties to have the contract annulled because of 
injury - Actio Pauliana _, the dissolution of the contract, 
etc." (a). Three different laws would thus complete the con-
· , 
tract, three different laws would supply clauses omitted by the 
parties: three different laws might prohibit some (and, probably, 
different) clauses inserted by the parties and the mandatory 
rules of three different laws would replace these prohibited clauses. 
And it would be no argument to say that these three laws, the 
law of the port of loading, the law of the port of destination and 
the law of the flag, would in this concrete case be the same, as they 
would all three be Dutch law. The fact that, under an application 
rule, these three laws may by accident coincide, makes no difference 
as regards the provisions of the rule and the fact that it happens 
that the Dutch Court must follow the nile in cases where the indi-
cated law is the Dutch law does not affect the system qua system. 
It is and remains a fact that here the law of the port of loading, 
· the law of the port of discharge and the law of the flag are all 
· indicated as the law applicable to the carriage of goods by sea, even 
though only in so far as concerns a few articles and for carriage 
to or from Dutch ports or by a Dutch ship. From a scientific point 
of view, the system, to say the least of it, does not appear to be 
correct, for an application rule should indicate the principle to be 
applied and not merely a few laws which it is easier for the Judge 
to apply. 
§ 2. But we have not yet achieved our object. There is still more. 
We just now assumed that the application rules, instead of indicating 
a few articles only, made the whole Dutch law applicable. But 
there is a second complication: the application rules declare only 
a few, carelessly selected articles applicable. How, logically speak-
ing, that is possible, is an enigma, for according to the Legislator, 
a certain law either governs the contract or it does 'not govern the 
contract. How is it, however, possible for some forty articles of a 
certain law to govern the position of the parties whilst the rest of 
the contract remains ungoverned? If the Legislator does not know. 
or does not wish to say, which law governs the contract, then it is 
for the Judge to choose the law according to his own convictions. 




But here we have the Legislator first of all pointing not to the 
law applicable, but to some forty applicable articles: and then 
leaving it to the Judge to choose the law to govern the contract, 
The latter, if he takes his task seriously, will never judge the 
contract according to all three of the possible laws: law of the 
place of loading, law of the place of destination and law of the 
flag. He can, therefore, never follow the Legislator's method, but 
must adopt some new criterion. The result is, as we have seen, tha~ 
the contract is governed, in a few particulars, by the law indicated 
by the Legislator, after that by the law deemed applicable by the 
Judge and, in so far as the two laws thus indicated by the two 
authorities, permit, by the law chosen by the parties. Thus the law, 
chosen by the Judge, must not conflict with the mandatory articles 
declared applicable by the Legislator, and the law chosen by the 
parties must not conflict with the mandatory rules either of the law 
chosen by the Legislator, in so far as it is made applicable, or of the 
law chosen by the Judge. A remarkable system indeed. 
In Chapter I § 6 of the Second Part of this book we have seen 
that the rules of application on this subject differ essentially from 
those of the Law Embodying the General Principles of the Legis-
lation of the Kingdom, the "Wet, Houdende Algemeene Be-
palingen der Wetgeving van het Koningrijk" (May 15 th 1829). 
Now the reason is apparent: the rules contained in the Wet A. B. 
(as the Wet, Houdende Algemeene Bepalingen etc. Is called) declare 
~ one law applicable to a given subject: these rules apply three dIf-
ferent laws. And If Ripert takes exception (in § 1468 of his book) 
ito the system adopted in the Morocco Code, article 267, and calls 
• that system "une disposition exorbitante", just because it ventures 
to "appliquer it la fois aux transports qui sont it destination au en 
provenance d'un port national et it I'appliquer meme si Ie connais-
sement est cree it I' etranger et entre etrangers", what would his 
; opinion be of the Dutch Commercial Code in this respect? 
We have seen the objections consisting in the fact that only a 
few articles are applied instead of the whole law: and the fact that 
a combination of three laws is deemed to govern the contract: but 
in addition to these objections there are practical disadvantages 
resulting from the combination of different rules of application. 
Let us take an Instance. 
• 
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Articles 518h-k are applicable to transport to Dutch ports (article 
520f). In Stockholm a voyage-charter is concluded between two 
Swedes for the carriage of timber from a Swedish port to Amster-
dam by a Swedish vessel. The contract is drawn up in the Swedish 
language. the freight is payable in Swedish currency. The voyage-
charterer concludes a sub-charter at the port of loading with a 
third party. likewise of Swedish nationality. In the original charter-
party no mention is made of sub-chartering and we assume that the 
original charterer is permitted by Swedish law to conclude such a 
sub-charter. In Amsterdam the owner brings an action against the 
original charterer for compensation (or to have the contract dis-
solved), and though the whole question clearly must be decided by 
Swedish law, article 520f makes article 518h of the Dutch law 
applicable. According to that article, the original charterer had no 
right to conclude a sub-charter, as the charter party made no men-
tion of sub-chartering: compensation would he awarded. This 
supposed decision can hardly be called just, even if it would be in 
complete accordance with the application rule the Judge has to 
follow. One wonders what Dutch law has to do with this case; 
however, the law of the port of destination governs this particular 
matter of transport to Holland, and the Court must comply with 
the legislative provisions regarding the law to be applied. 
} Now, another example, any day liable to come into reality: two 
Germans conclude a voyage-charter concerning a German ship at 
Hamburg, in the German language. Goods belonging to the char-
terer are to be loaded at Rotterdam for discharge at Hamburg. 
During the carriage the goods are damaged. The charterer sues the 
owner before the Court of Justice of his place of residence, Rotter-
, dam. It appears that the owner is only responsible to the extent 
\ offiftygt1I!d!E"..1'~!~ct1~~cmetre net capacity of the ship, for article 
1. 474.is made applicable byartide 517d to cardage'from Dufch ports. 
According to German law such a limitation of liability would not 
exist or would be regulated in another manner. Why then does 
the Dutch law apply? We have, in fact, seen that it is generally 
accepted thattli,,' extent of the owner's liability is determined by his 
own national law, or rather by the law of the transporting ship. The 
result, produced by the Dutch law, is, consequently, absolutely in 
conflict with these generally accepted principles. . 
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§ 3. If one may be permitted to suggest a system of Private In-
ternational Law de jure constituendo in place of the conglomeration 
of different criteria adopted in our Commercial Code, then the system 
of the law of the flag is to be recommended. The advantages of this 
system have been amply expounded here. The disadvantage in regard 
to the negotiability 01 bills of lading could be met by a special regu-
lation for bills 01 lading issued in Holland; this regulation, however, 
would have to be strictly confined to such bills 01 lading and should 
simply impose the necessary restriction as to the carrier's liability. 
This regulation could then, notWithstanding the fact that the 
law 01 the flag lundamentally governs the contract of carriage, be 
applied by the Courts on the ground of public policy, in the sense 
that the proper and originally applicable law (that of the flag) is 
replaced by a rule of the lex fori (with special reference to bills 
01 lading) in order to protect the interest of third parties. 
Would a rule, such as the rule that contracts 01 carriage are to be 
governed by the law of the flag, constitute a novum for the Dutch 
doctrine? This solution consists of the judging of the relations be-
tween one person or a group of persons (the carrier or shipping 
company) on one side and a number of independent persons, pre-
Viously unrelated (the shippers or consignees) on the other side, 
according to the law 01 the country 01 the person or group of per-
sons first mentioned, irrespective of where the contract was con ... 
c1uded or must be executed. From the point of view of international 
law the pOSition 01 the carrier in relation to the shippers or consig-
nees of diflerent nationality (if their nationality is the same, there 
is all the more reason to apply the common national law of the 
flag) can very well be compared to that of the insurance-company in 
relation to insured persons of different nationality and domicile. 
In the latter case Dutch jurisprudence and doctrine assume it 
to have been the intention oftlie insurance-company that its own 
national law should apply to its agreements, whilst on the other 
hand the insured person is deemed "vertrouwen te stellen in de be-
dr,ijfsorganisatie en zich te hebben willen onderwerpen aan het 
recht, hetwelk dat bedrijf regeert (b)". 
(b) Kosters p. 757 (to have confidence in the organisation of the insurer's 
business and to have submitted -himself to the law governing that 
business). 
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This reasoning also applies in justification of the choice of the l 
law of the flag to govern the contract for carriage of goods by sea.l 
for "1m Seerecht ist das Recht der Plagge das Quasi-Personal-
Statut des den Erwevb durch den Seefahrt treibenden Unter-l 
nehmens" (c). 
The two cases are. indeed. absolutely parallel; he who defends 
the one. is logically forced to accept the other. Er",,"~""JC!l"c1raws this 
conclusion as regards transports by land. but" omits to do so as 
regards transport by sea. Nussbaum (e) writes: "Wer mit einer 
Bank. einer Versicherungsgesellschaft. einer Transportanstalt oder 
einem ahnlichen Unternehmen. das in grossem Umfange Geschafte 
typischer Art abzuschliessen pflegt. als Kunde in Verbindung tritt. 
muss davon ausgehen.dass erdiese Geschaftsverbindung demjenigen 
Recht unterwirft. unter welchem das Unternehmen lebt; dies schon 
deshalb. weil er sich sagen muss. dass das Unternehmen mit auS-
landischen und inlandischen Kunden im Zweifel unter gleichen 
rechtlichen Bedingungen arbeiten will." 
§ 4. In the Wet. Houdende Algemeene Bepalingen der Wet-
geving van het Koningrijk. (Law Embodying the General Principles 
Governing the Legislation of the Realm) an article should therefore 
be inserted making the law of the flag applicable to contracts for 
c"rriage of goods by sea. 
The rules. contained in the Commercial Code. which guarantee 
the negotiability of the bill of lading. ought to be made applicable 
to bills of lading issued for transport from Dutch ports. This would 
provide a system Scientifically sound ;~dI;ir t;; the parties to the 
contract. and which would guarantee the negotiability of the bill of 
lading. thereby protecting the rights of third parties. whilst at the 
same time it would be in accordance with the prevailing Dutch con-
ception of the law. A system. in short. which is. in our opinion. 
desirable for everyone; which does justice to the rights of everyone. 
functions in a simple. practical and easy way. and permits of nO 
(c) Nussbaum p". 213; See also Lewald p. 219. Gutzwiller p. 1609-1610. 
(d) p. 143. I 1 
(e) p. 231. 
133 
uncertainty; which obviates confusion as to the law applicable and 
is easy for the Judge to apply. 
Questions relating to loading" and discharge must remain subject 
to the law of the place where these operations are carried out. as 
article 517d § 2 quite rightly provides. This regulation should. 
however. also be incorporated in the Wet Houdende Algemeene 
Bepalingen der Wetgeving van het Koningrijk. 
